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In many decision tasks, we have a set of alternative choices and are faced with the problem of how to use our latent beliefs and preferences about each alternative to make a single choice. Cognitive and decision models typically presume that beliefs and preferences are distilled to a scalar latent strength for each alternative, but it is also critical to model how people use these latent strengths to choose a single alternative. Most models follow one of two traditions to establish this link. Modern psychophysics and memory researchers make use of signal detection theory, assuming that latent strengths are perturbed by noise, and the highest resulting signal is selected. By contrast, many modern decision theoretic modeling and machine learning approaches use the softmax function (which is based on Luce’s choice axiom; Luce, 1959) to give some weight to non-maximal-strength alternatives. Despite the prominence of these two theories of choice, current approaches rarely address the connection between them, and the choice of one or the other appears more motivated by the tradition in the relevant literature than by theoretical or empirical reasons to prefer one theory to the other. The goal of the current work is to revisit this topic by elucidating which of these two models provides a better characterization of latent processes in -alternative decision tasks, with a particular focus on memory tasks. In a set of visual memory experiments, we show that, within the same experimental design, the softmax parameter varies across -alternatives, whereas the parameter of the signal-detection model is stable. Together, our findings indicate that replacing softmax with signal-detection link models would yield more generalizable predictions across changes in task structure. More ambitiously, the invariance of signal detection model parameters across different tasks suggests that the parametric assumptions of these models may be more than just a mathematical convenience, but reflect something real about human decision-making. 

Chunks allow us to use long-term knowledge to efficiently represent the world in working memory. Most views of chunking assume that when we use chunks, this results in the loss of specific perceptual details, since it is presumed the contents of chunks are decoded from long-term memory rather than reflecting the exact details of the item that was presented. However, in two experiments, we find that in situations where participants make use of chunks to improve visual working memory, access to instance-specific perceptual detail (that cannot be retrieved from long-term memory) increased, rather than decreased. This supports an alternative view: that chunks facilitate the encoding and retention into memory of perceptual details as part of structured, hierarchical memories, rather than serving as mere “content-free” pointers. It also provides a strong contrast to accounts in which working memory capacity is assumed to be exhaustively described by the number of chunks remembered. 

Existing knowledge shapes and distorts our memories, serving as a prior for newly encoded information. Here, we investigate the role of stable long-term priors (e.g. categorical knowledge) in conjunction with priors arising from recently encountered information (e.g. ’serial dependence’) in visual working memory for color. We use an iterated reproduction paradigm to allow a model-free assessment of the role of such priors. In Experiment 1, we find that participants’ reports reliably converge to certain areas of color space, but that this convergence is largely distinct for different individuals, suggesting responses are biased by more than just shared category knowledge. In Experiment 2, we explicitly manipulate trial n-1 and find recent history plays a major role in participants’ reports. Thus, we find that both global prior knowledge and recent trial information have biasing influences on visual working memory, demonstrating an important role for both shortand long-term priors in actively maintained information.